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Abstract  
Starting from almost null in the late 1990s, China’s mobile phone handset industry has grown to account 
for more than 40 percent of the current world production. While export growth has been overwhelmingly 
led by multi-national corporations (MNCs), increasingly fierce competition in the domestic market ignited 
by the advent of local handset makers has induced unique industrial evolution: (1) outgrowth of 
independent design houses specialized in handset development and (2) emergence of IC fabless ventures 
that design core ICs for handsets. In the background of this evolutionary industrial growth there are factors 
such as, the scale and increasing diversity of China’s domestic market that advantages local firms vis-à-vis 
MNCs; modularization of handset and semiconductor technologies; policy interventions that supports 
local startups. The emergence and evolution of China’s handset industry is likely to have international 
implications as the growth of the global demand for low-cost and multi-function mobile phone handsets is 
expected to accelerate. Thus, our case suggests that the conventional view of latecomer industrialization 
and upgrading that emphasizes the key role of international production networks organized by MNCs 
needs to be modified in order to accommodate China’s rise into perspective. 
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I. Introduction 
 
The rise of the East Asian electronics industry in the context of globalization has attracted a wide 
range of research interest. Regardless of variance in analytical approach, it is almost unequivocally 
acknowledged that multi-national corporations (MNCs) from the US, Japan, Europe, and more 
recently also from East Asian frontrunners such as Korea and Taiwan, have played key roles in 
fostering the export-led growth of the East Asian electronics industry. Aiming to achieve cost 
reduction with assured quality, MNCs establish affiliates, subcontract part of production to local 
suppliers, or outsource the whole manufacturing process of final products to competent local 
manufacturers (referred to as OEM, or original equipment manufacturing). These various types of 
cross-border transaction usually accompany varying degree of technology transfer, which facilitates, 
either deliberately or unintentionally, capability building of MNCs’ local affiliates, subcontractors or 
OEM vendors. One of the central concern of the literature has been the way how Asian local 
economies and firms interact with MNCs that organize international production networks (IPN) so 
that the Asian latecomers can enhance their technological capabilities and capture better chances to 
get themselves involved in higher value-added activities within IPNs1. 
 
China has been emerging as one of the major producers of electronics products since the late 1990s2. 
Sweeping market liberalization on the eve of accession to the WTO and following upsurge of foreign 
direct investment drastically accelerated the trend. This naturally has led to mounting research 
interest in the development of the electronics industry in China. Meanwhile, studies motivated by  
the IPN theory are yet to fully incorporate China’s emergence into their analytical framework. The 
shortfall is, we believe, to a great extent attributable to the paucity of case-based studies that can 
bridge the gap between international perspectives and China’s indigenous industrialization 
experience that has its distinct characteristics3. 
 
In this context, we explore in this paper the emergence and organizational evolution of China’s 
indigenous mobile phone handset industry since the late 1990s up to today. Through our case study 
we highlight a dual-track nature of the industry’s development in China. We use the term 
                                                        
1 For the IPN (also referred to as global production network or cross-border production network, of 
which difference we disregard here) framework and its application to the Asian electronics industry 
see Borrus et al.[2000], Yusuf et al.[2004], and numerous works by Ernst (1998; 2004; more) and 
Hobday (1995; 2000; 2001; more) . The dichotomy of East Asian “OEM-led growth” and Southeast 
Asian “TNC-led growth” proposed by Hobday places great emphasis on the role of local firms, but it 
still sees the involvement in IPNs as the prime pathway for late-comer growth..    
2 See Appendix for the share of China in the world production of electronic products and IT 
hardware. (*We are updating the data soon.) 
3 Refer to Lu [2000], Steinfeld [2004], and others. 
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“dual-track” in the following sense: while export growth has been overwhelmingly driven by MNCs’ 
affiliates and joint ventures, it is the robust growth and increasing diversity of the domestic market 
that has made it possible for local firms to brake into the business once monopolized by a few giant 
MNCs. 
 
Our case study will show that increasingly heated competition in the domestic market ignited by the 
advent of local makers has induced organizational or technological innovations; the innovations are 
adaptive to China’s market environment, where strong cost sensitivity and enduring quests for 
novelty coexist. These domestic-competition-induced innovations, as we call them, may have 
international implications as the global demand for low-cost and multi-function mobile phone 
handsets is expected to grow in coming years. Thus, our case suggests that the conventional 
IPN-centric view of latecomer industrialization and upgrading may need to be modified in order to 
fully accommodate China’s rise. 
 
The remaining sections are organized as follows. Section II sketches the emergence of China’s 
mobile phone handset industry, focusing specifically on the rise of local handset makers from the 
late 1990s to 2003 and retreat that soon followed. Sections III and IV bring forth two new 
developments generated from mounting competition in the local handset market, i.e. outgrowth of 
independent design houses and core-chip fabless ventures, which we regard as variants of backward 
linkage effects a la Hirschman (1957). We will also refer to the impact of policy interventions on 
industrial development in these sections. In Section V we analyze dynamics of the industrial 
evolution described in the preceding sections, invoking again Hirschman’s linkage concept. Section 
VI summarizes and concludes the paper with reference to international implications of China’s 
experience. 
 
II. Local Handset Makers: From Rise to Retreat4 
 
Beginning in the 1990s mobile telecommunication service started a full-fledged growth worldwide. 
The trend soon spread to China. The country experienced literary explosive growth in the number of 
mobile phone subscribers during the second half of the 1990s (Figure 1). Although the growth has 
slowed down recently as the urban market got saturated in terms of penetration rate, average annual 
growth rate during the first half of the 2000s still exceeded 30 percent. A decade of high-speed 
growth made China by far the largest market of mobile phone handsets in the world with more than 
four hundred million subscribers. The latest nationwide penetration rate is slightly more than 30 
                                                        
4 For the development of China’s handset makers see Enterprise Research Institute [2005] and 
Kimura [2006]. 
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percent, meaning there remains huge potential to be exploited in the future in China’s handset 
market. 
 
Figure 1. Number of Telephone Subscribers in China 
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Table 1. China's Mobile Phone Handset Industry: Summary Figures
(Millions of handsets, %)
Export Ratio
(A) (B) (C) (A)-(B)+(C)
1998 4.0 2.2 1.6 3.4 55.1% 2.3%
1999 22.6 5.7 3.0 19.9 25.2% 8.0%
2000 53.4 22.8 6.0 36.6 42.6% 12.2%
2001 87.0 39.7 7.5 54.8 45.6% 21.8%
2002 131.6 63.3 17.2 85.5 48.1% 31.2%
2003 182.3 95.3 22.1 109.0 52.3% 35.6%
2004 233.4 146.0 12.7 100.1 62.6% 34.6%
2005 303.5 228.3 12.8 88.0 75.2% 37.2%
Production Exports Imports DomesticConsumption
(B)/(A)
Share in
World
Production
Note: The accuracy of official production figure from which series (A) is compiled is doubtful
especially for 2004 to 2005 as most of other available information suggests the growth of
domestic consumption remained in place in the period, though at much lower speed.
Source: Compiled by the author based on MII statistics (domestic production), custom statistics
(trade), and estimates by Gartner (world production).  
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Driven by the surge demand both in the world and domestic markets, China’s mobile phone handset 
industry has exhibited a spectacular growth since the late 1990s (Table 1). The country’s share in the 
world production shot up from a negligible few percent to nearly 40 percent by 20055. Exports and 
domestic consumption rose almost in parallel until 2003, after which the latter became more or less 
flat. In 2005 around 75 percent of handsets produced in China are exported. Although local handset 
makers turn increasingly outward-looking recently, MNCs altogether still contribute to close to 95 
percent of the exports. Thus, just like many of other electronics industries, export growth of China’s 
handset industry has been overwhelmingly led by MNCs to date. 
 
When we turn our eyes to the domestic market, however, a strikingly distinct picture shows up. 
Figure 2 presents the trend of the aggregated share of local brands vis-à-vis foreign brands in China’s 
domestic market based on official data released from the Ministry of Information Industry (MII). 
Stating from just around five percent in 1999, the local brands’ share increased very steeply until 
2003, when the official media triumphantly announced Chinese handset makers eventually captured 
more than 50 percent of the domestic market; then almost all of a sudden came the reversal. Since 
2004 a majority of local handset makers slid into retreat, which has continued until early 2006. 
Below we highlight the process how local makers realized the initial success and experienced serious 
retreat subsequently; then we introduce new developments that have been induced by struggles by 
local handset makers to adapt themselves to China’s ever-changing market environment.  
 
Figure 2. The Aggregates Shares of Local Brands and Foreign Brands 
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Source: MII. 
                                                        
5 It is reported that China’s share in the world’s handset production exceeded 40 percent in the first 
half of 2006. 
 6
 Rise of local handset makers: 1998-2003 
 
Up until the late 1990s China’s market of mobile phone handset had been virtually monopolized by a 
few giant MNCs, Motorola and Nokia per excellence, two of which accounted for more than 70 
percent of the market altogether. As imports of finished handsets were strictly controlled by the 
quota system, both of the two companies set up joint ventures with state-owned telecommunication 
equipment makers, Capitel and Eastcom respectively. The role assigned to the joint ventures was no 
more than assembling of components into finished handsets, leaving the local partners few chances 
to acquire technological capability from the transaction6. Other MNCs followed suit. The Chinese 
government adopted GSM (Global System for Mobile Telecommunication) as the second generation 
(2G) system of cellular phone in 1994. This decision turned out to be very helpful in enhancing 
competition in the domestic market as GSM became the most widely used 2G standard in the 
world7. 
tions such as 
inimum export ratio and local contents requirement on foreign joint ventures (FJVs). 
                                                       
 
At the initial phase of the industry’s growth, policy interventions played an important role in 
supporting entries by local firms. As the market opportunity loomed large in the 1990s, the 
government came to recognize the importance of the mobile telecommunication industries including 
handset development and production. In early 1999, the State Council approved a joint policy 
proposal submitted by MII and then State Planning Commission titled “Some Proposition on 
Promoting the Development of the Mobile Information Industry” (referred to as “Decree No.5”). 
With a view to curbing further expansion of foreign brands and promoting the indigenous handset 
industry, the decree required all makers to acquire license for producing and marketing mobile 
handsets and permission for adding production lines from MII, and imposed regula
m
 
Virtually all the major foreign handset makers from the US, Europe, Japan and Korea successfully 
acquired licenses via their FJVs. The regulations targeted at FJVs were not very strictly enforced, 
possibly because they evidently run counter to the spirit of the WTO8. But the regulations still 
circumscribed expected rapid expansion of foreign brands in the domestic market. Owing to the 
 
6 A retired president who led the initial success of Eastcom’s mobile handset business recalls the 
lack of chance of technology acquisition in the JV with Motorola (21st Century Business Herald,  
December 28, 2005). 
7 2G is the first generation of digital wireless telecommunication technology that came into 
commercial use in the early 1990s. China later also adopted CDMA, a 2G standard used mainly in a 
limited number of countries such as the US and Korea. The share of CDMA service, however has 
stagnated around ten percent. 
8 Interview with a Japanese maker’s affiliate in Beijing (August 24, 2004). 
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quota control, increase in the imports of complete handsets lagged well behind the growth of 
domestic consumption (Table 1 above), which in effect further lifted the profit margin of the handset 
usiness. 
arket was to ally 
ith any of local makers that was given a license but lacked technological prowess. 
 of their success can be summed up as a 
arketing-focused strategy based on borrowed technology. 
se of the paging service and eventually made a decision to shift to the 
obile handset business. 
                                                       
b
 
The most important impact of the decree was that it effectively barred further entries of foreign 
latecomers, mostly Korean and Taiwanese companies9. At that time Korea was in the aftermath of 
the Asian financial crises; massive downsizing by large electronics companies such as Samsung 
Electronics and LG Electronics had generated a number of mobile handset ventures (Abe 2006). In 
Taiwan, many ODMs (Own Design Manufacture) vendors in the personal computer and peripheral 
industries had just started to diversify into the mobile handset business and were eager to extend 
their customer base to the mainland (Kawakami 2006). As the chance of acquiring licenses on their 
own was slim, the quickest alternative for them to cash in on the alluring Chinese m
w
 
While Decree No.5 and related policy measures rendered indirect supports to Chinese firms that 
wished to enter into the handset business, they needed to devise a effective strategy in order to cut 
into the market dominated by established foreign brands. Aside from telecom equipment makers 
such as Eastcom or Capitel that had joint ventures with MNCs, a majority of Chinese firms that 
acquired license were new comers to the industry, having little or practically no expertise in wireless 
telecom technology. Paradoxically enough, precisely among those new comers did emerge early 
successful local makers that led the initial growth of China’s indigenous mobile handset industry. In 
contrast to established state-owned telecom equipment makers, the new comers had far greater 
latitude to exercise improvisational entrepreneurship, which turned out to be more than enough to 
make up for their lack of technological expertise10. The key
m
 
Bird is the most representative of such pioneering local makers. Starting from a tiny private venture 
producing pagers in 1992, the company had grown to become the second largest manufacturer of 
pagers next to Motorola in 1998. Prior to the event, nevertheless, company executives accurately 
foresaw the coming eclip
m
 
This was a reckless decision in view of big technological gap between developing pagers and mobile 
 
9 Interviews with local handset makers (2004-2005). 
10 Most of the successful new comers were either virtually private enterprises or manager-controlled 
state-owned enterprises (for the concept of manager-controlled state-owned enterprises see Imai 
2006a). 
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phone handsets. Bird circumvented this problem by borrowing technologies from others. The 
company established a joint venture with Sagem, a French telecommunication equipment maker. 
Sagem provided the JV with handset design, technical assistance and procurement service. Handsets 
produced by the JV were sold under Bird brand in the domestic market and under Sagem brand in 
the European market. At the same time, Bird also sourced handset designs from second-tier Korean 
akers and independent design houses and finished handset products from Taiwanese ODMs. 
ed extravagantly by selling designs, knock-down kits, or finished handsets to 
hinese makers12.  
the case that there are even third-tier dealers that go between 
econd-tear dealers and retailers14. 
                                                       
m
 
Virtually all of other Chinese entrants to the handset business adopted similar tactics. TCL, one of 
the largest Chinese TV makers, sourced wireless modules from Wavecom, a French wireless 
venture11, and finished handsets from Compal, a major Taiwanese ODM vender, in diversifying into 
the handset business. During the early days of China’s mobile handset industry many Korean and 
Taiwanese firms thriv
C
 
Outsourcing most of product development and manufacturing at the initial stage allowed pioneer 
local handset makers to focus primarily on marketing to challenge the dominance of established 
foreign brands. In China, telecom operators, i.e. China Mobile and China Unicom, have involved 
themselves little in the marketing of handsets until quite recently13. Typically, handsets are sold by 
makers to large first-tier dealers that covers nationwide or several provinces. The first-tier dealers 
then distribute the products to second-tier dealers that covers much smaller areas, which in turn sell 
the products to retailers. It is often 
s
 
Earning hefty profits from distributing foreign brand products, major nationwide dealers had little 
reason to be interested in dealing seriously with local new entrants of which brands were barely 
recognized by consumers in the handset market at that time. In response, Bird and other local 
pioneers turned their eyes to markets neglected by MNCs and their nationwide dealers: the rural area, 
townships, small cities, and hinterlands. In these areas, as penetration of mobile phone had just 
 
11 A wireless module is a pre-assembled electronic circuit board of the core of handset system. 
12 It is reported that at the point of 2003 approximately two thirds of local brand handset shipped 
were designed by Korean makers, independent design houses, and Taiwanese ODMs (“Both sides of 
straits racing for handset outsourcing,” 21st Century Business Herald, February 21, 2005 [in 
Chinese]). 
13 Recently the telecom operators’ involvement in handset marketing has been increasing in order to 
promote differentiated value-added telecom services. This trend may potentially change the nature of 
competition in China’s handset market. 
14 This is not more than a very simplified picture of a typical distribution model. In actuality there 
are a number of variations; ways how distribution channels are organized are changing rapidly, 
which we can not afford to detail here. 
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started, consumers’ recognition of foreign brands were far less established than in mainstream 
markets like Beijing or Shanghai. Focusing on these potentially big left-out segments of the market, 
local makers directly accessed to second-tier or even third-tier dealers and offered them incentives 
more attractive than foreign brands did, such as compensating all the inventory loss incurred by 
dealers owing to reduction in retail price. They also deployed thousands of contract salespersons to 
retail outlets in order to promote their products directly to consumers, who were by and large 
ill-informed about the novel gadget called mobile phone and apt to accept salesperson’s advice. Low 
financial cost due to lax monetary policy at that time also prompted local handset makers to adapt 
ggressive marketing strategies15.  
ch aware of the importance of 
eveloping handsets customized specifically to the Chinese market.  
an effort to alleviate their disadvantage vis-à-vis foreign rivals in product 
evelopment.  
                                                       
a
 
Besides, in an attempt to make up for their technological disadvantage, local handset makers also 
placed great emphasis on exterior design that fitted Chinese consumers’ preference. This tactic 
helped boost the local brands’ sales, as at that time MNCs were not mu
d
 
Retreat of major local makers and further development 
The initial success of local handset makers peaked in 2003, when it was reported that Bird had 
exceeded Motorola to be the number one in China’s handset market in terms of shipment (Figure 3). 
In the same year TCL’s shipment also came quite close to Motorola and Nokia. By this time urban 
consumers had gradually begun to recognize local brands, though mainly in low- and mid-end 
segments of the market. In the meantime, major local makers had set out to acquire designing 
capabilities in 
d
 
Subsequent developments proved the fragility of the success built predominantly on the 
marketing-focused strategy. It happened that in this year color LCD phones were introduced to the 
mainland’s market by foreign makers, which soon caught on especially among urban consumers. 
Rapid transition from monochrome to color LCD brought local makers big troubles. The transition 
substantially increased the complexity of handset product development and widened technological 
gap between local and foreign makers again16. It took months for local makers to catch up with the 
new trend but the delay turned out to be costly. As a result of aggressive marketing and poor supply 
chain management local makers faced with huge inventory of monochrome LCD phones and 
 
15 Since the late 1990s to 2002 the government exercised expansive monetary policy in order to 
prop up economic growth. This prompted banks to extend loans to whichever business that was 
benefited from rampant market expansion. 
16 Quick penetration of camera phones and other multimedia features almost at the same period 
affected major local makers similarly. 
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modules that depreciated at an accelerating pace. The inventory loss compensation system for 
ealers, which once had helped local makers’ success, affected them negatively this time. 
 
d
Figure 3. Trend of Market Share:
Four Leading Foreign and Local Makers
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on middle-end 
roducts, they put a brake on further penetration by local makers to the urban market. 
ing Eastcom and Capitel went out of own-brand business or virtually went bust during the 
ear. 
 
On the other hand, MNCs had already learned lessons form their lack of emphasis on marketing and 
commenced countermeasures. Beginning in 2003, Nokia restructured its marketing policy in China 
and extended its marketing efforts beyond the mainstream market and placed more emphasis on 
lower-end consumers, apparently imitating the tactics of local handset makers. Motorola also 
followed suit. At the same time, by diversifying product lineup with more emphasis 
p
 
These successive events collectively led to a sharp decline of the market share of local handset 
makers beginning in 2004, as is shown in Figures 2 and 3. Almost all of leading local makers such as 
Bird, TCL, Amoi and Konka suffered huge financial loss in 2005. A number of early entrants 
includ
y
 
However, the drastic downfall of major local makers did not prevent proliferation of new entrants 
that wish to benefit from the future growth potential in the domestic market. The entry regulation 
stipulated by Decree No.5 had been increasingly circumvented by borrowing licenses from inactive 
 11
license-endowed makers. Eventually, in March 2005, the regulation was replaced with a much more 
laxed approval system, which resulted in new entries by more than 30 mostly local companies.  
f the number of makers China’s handset market is apparently the most 
ompetitive in the world17. 
Figure 4. Market Share of Handset Makers in China (2005/GSM+CDMA) 
re
 
At the point of 2005, handset shipments by the three global giants, i.e. Nokia, Motorola, and 
Samsung, accounted for virtually a half of the domestic market (Figure 4). The other half of the 
market was jam-packed by no less than fifty own-brand makers and illegal entrants of which number 
remain uncertain. In terms o
c
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Note: Company names in italic denote foreign brands. 
Source: Norson Telecom Consultancy. (*To be updated)  
kward 
                                                       
 
In the following two sections we examine outgrowth of two types of new business: independent 
design houses and core IC fabless ventures. Both of them have emerged in response to the growth of 
local final product producers to provide them with physical or intangible inputs and have been 
thriving on the increasingly fierce competition in China’s handset market. At the same time, they are 
kinds of adaptive innovation in the sense that, based essentially on preexisting technologies, they 
have been altering the way how China’s mobile handset industry is organized so that it is more 
tailored to local market environments. In this connection we assume them as variants of bac
 
17 In the Japanese market, which is a half as large as the Chinese market in terms of handset 
shipment, there are only 17 makers supplying handsets, including six foreign makers of which 
market share is almost negligible.  
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linkage effects conceptualized by Hirschman (1957). We will return to the point in Section V. 
II. The First Backward Linkage Effect: Independent Design Houses 
cess (say, 
xterior design or mechanical design) for handset makers or other IDHs as subcontractors. 
-changing market conditions, and 
equent frictions caused probably by lack of mutual trust19. 
                                                       
I
 
An independent design house (IDH) in the context of the mobile handset industry is a firm that is 
specialized in the development of mobile handsets18. Figure 5 (see next page) summarizes the 
development process of mobile handsets. The process is essentially composed of four distinctive 
steps: (i) product definition, (ii) product design, (iii) pilot production and review, and (iv) testing and 
acquisition of certification. Product development is further categorized into four processes: exterior 
design, mechanical design, hardware design, and software design. Major IDHs are capable of 
undertaking the whole process of development from product definition to certification acquisition. 
Some of them even take on procurement of components and management of contract manufacturing 
on their own and ship completed handsets (or semi-assembled kits) to customers. On the other hand, 
there are numerous minuscule IDHs that undertake only one or two of the designing pro
e
 
IDH as a mode of business was originally developed in Korea since the late 1990s. As we mentioned 
previously, Korean IDHs were the major providers of handset design to local handset makers during 
the earliest years of China’s handset industry along with Taiwanese ODMs. However, as the 
competition in the domestic handset market became intense, local handset makers felt increasingly 
dissatisfied with outsourcing product development to Korean IDHs on account of high cost, 
insufficiency in flexibility to make quick adaptations to ever
fr
 
Emergence of local IDHs 
Chinese local IDHs emerged soon after the onset of the handset industry in China. Since around 
2002, the growth of local IDHs was accelerated. Exploiting their advantage in labor cost, familiarity 
with the demand of customers and Chinese consumers, and keenness to make adaptations, local 
IDHs virtually replaced their Korean and Taiwanese rivals as the mainstream players in the design 
outsourcing business for Chinese handset makers by 2004 to 200520 . The drastic decline of 
 
18 Independent design houses specialized in the development of electronic devices were born in the 
US in the trend of design outsourcing beginning in the 1990s (See Engardio and Einhorn 2005 and 
Wilson 2004). Cellon, a San-Jose-based venture established in 1999 by Chinese and US engineers 
claims to be the first IDH specialized in mobile handset development. Cellon soon establishes a joint 
venture, CECW, in China and shifted its focus on the Chinese market (see Table 2 below). 
19 Interview with a major local handset maker and other sources.  
20 Taiwanese ODMs shifted their focus on transactions with MNCs rather than Chinese makers in 
expectation of better chance of learning by doing (Kawakami 2006, pp.78-9). However, they still 
account for a certain fraction of the handset outsourcing business in the mainland market. 
 13
outsourcing orders from Chinese makers forced a number of Korean IDHs to go bust after 2003 
(Abe 2006, .44-5) 21. 
Figure 5. Process of Typical 2G Handset Development 
 
 
 
 
estimates suggest that at least 40 to 50 percent of handsets shipped by local makers are designed by 
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According to estimates made by US consultancy iSuppli and other sources, there are 50 to 60 IDHs 
that are capable of undertaking the process of product development in an integrated way22. Rough 
 
21 Remaining IDHs are more or less subordinate to three major handset makers, i.e., Samsung, LG, 
and Pantech This contrasts starkly with the outstanding presence of IDHs in China.  
22 It is estimated that there are 300 to 500 small IDHs that undertake only a part of development 
such as exterior design or mechanical design, most of which are located in Shenzhen and Shanghai. 
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IDHs23. Thus the presence of IDHs in China’s handset market is exceptionally large in contrast to 
the global market, where in-house development by handset makers remains dominant. Below we 
examine the factors in the background of the emergence of local IDHs and its implications. 
 
The most important background factor of the emergence of Chinese IDHs is the global trend of the 
growing maturation and modularization of the second generation (2G) mobile handset technologies. 
Typically, 2G handset are developed based on so called platforms, which are predominantly provided 
by a limited number of US and European semiconductor vendors such as Texas Instrument (TI), 
Philips Semiconductors (now reorganized as NXP), Qualcomm in the case of CDMA and so on 
(later we will introduce the recent rise of Taiwanese and Chinese platform providers). Being the 
heart of the handset system, platform is basically composed of baseband IC chipset, i.e., a modem 
that is responsible for voice signal processing, and embedded protocol stack software, i.e., software 
that incorporates a set of procedure for signal transmission and reception. 
 
In contrast to the product development of the third generation (3G) cutting-edge handsets in which 
the development process of semiconductors and handsets closely interact, the development of 2G 
handsets are typically based on given platforms with little customization by platform providers. Thus 
the most critical issue in the handset development is how to assimilate the technologies incorporated 
in the platform and combine them with other key functions such as RF (wireless reception and 
transmission), power management, and non-voice data processing so that the handset can realize 
functions required by the product definition. Most of modules or chipsets that realize these key 
functions are also provided by various semiconductor vendors including platform providers 
themselves. In this sense, product development of 2G handsets is typically a process of assimilation 
and combination of existing technologies centered on a platform. 
 
At the onset of the mobile handset industry in China, the stock of local engineers who are capable of 
the above-mentioned assimilation and combination process were still quite limited. They were 
mostly concentrated on MNCs’ affiliates, especially Motorola, which had (and still has) the largest 
R&D facility in China among MNCs, the two most competent local wireless telecom equipment 
vendors, i.e., ZTE and Huawei Technologies, and some public research institutions. 
 
 
                                                        
23 Note that this is a very rough estimate that is apt to a substantial error margin. The chances are the 
share of IDHs in the indigenous handset industry may be much larger. There is wide divergence 
among the estimates of the annual shipment of handsets, ranging from 29 to 37 million units in 2005 
(respectively from Pday research, a Chinese consultancy, and iSuppli Corporation). Whichever 
figure we believe, IDHs’ share based on these shipment figures may exceed 50 percent of the 
shipment by local handset makers. 
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Competitive advantages 
As we examined in the previous section, in entering the handset business, most of local makers 
relied product designing on Korean IDHs or Taiwanese ODMs for the lack of technological expertise. 
The almost only competency of local makers vis-à-vis MNCs were their familiarity with and 
adaptability to the domestic market environment. Local IDHs emerged precisely in the background 
of this imbalance between local handset makers’ marketing capabilities and weak technological 
expertise. 
 
Profiles of the five largest IDHs are summarized in Table 2. The five IDHs account for more than 80 
percent of the handset design outsourcing market in China altogether24. It shows that most of their 
founders and/or core engineers came from electronics products distributors who had engineering 
backgrounds and close contact with the handset business, or spun-off employees from MNCs or a 
few competent local handset makers, typically Motorola (China) and ZTE. These people saw a great 
business chance in providing design outsourcing services to local handset makers in place of Korean 
IDHs or Taiwanese ODMs, by exploiting their familiarity with the domestic market combined with 
technological expertise learnt by doing in MNCs or competent local makers. 
   
Table 2. Profiles of five major IDHs  
 
Establishment,
founders, and the
management
Established in 2002 by Dong Defu, ex-sales manager of Motorola (China). 11
executive directors out of 13 came from Motorola. Listed on NASDAQ in
May 2005.
Scale Employees: 2,010 （August 2005)/Shipment: 11 million units (2005）
Major clients
Local: ZTE, Bird, Haier, Konka, Capitel, CECT, Lenovo, Panda, Soutec,
Eastom, Kejian, Huawei
Foregn: NEC, Kyocera, Mitsubishi Electric, UTStarcom, Sanyo Electric,
Alcatel
Establishment,
founders, and the
management
Established in 2000 as a joint venture between CEC (a state-owned
enterprise) and Cellon, a US-based IDH established by Jason Sun (electronic
component distributor) and others.
Scale Employees: 850 (including Cellon, 2005)/Shipment: 7 million units (2005)
Major clients Local: Haier, CEC, CECT, Konka, Amoi, TTA (TCL=Alcatel)Foreign: Siemens, Philips, Grandiente (Brazilian operator)
China Techfaith Wireless Communication Technology Limited
CECW Wireless Limited
 
(to be continued)
                                                        
24 Estimate by iSuppli Corporation. 
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Table 2. (continued) 
Establishment,
founders, and the
management
Established in 2001 by Wang Zutong and his wife Yang Wening, electronic
component distributors. General manager of handset division was ex-
executive director of ZTE's handset division. Listed on Hong Kong
Mainboard in May 2005.
Scale Employees: 497（June 2005, R&D staff only)/Shipment: 6 millon units (2005)
Major clients Local: Bird, Lenovo, Panda, Daxian, other small brand makersForeign: Telecom Italia Mobile (Italian operator), VK Mobile
Establishment,
founders, and the
management
Established in 2000 by Tao Qiang, mobile handset dealer, and several
engineers from ZTE. Four out of nine executive directors are engineers from
ZTE. Listed on Singapor Exchange in June 2005.
Scale Employee: 330 (2004)/Shipment: 5 million (2005)
Major clients Local: ZTE, Konka, Daxian, Soutec, Gionee, GT Mobile, Phonetech, Tianyuand other small brand makers
Establishment,
founders, and the
management
Established in 2000 by Li Hailin, ex-chief engineer of Konka's handset
division and the keyperson of the first national project of GSM handset
development. Most of key engineers came from Konka
Scale Employees: Around 300/Shipment: 3 million unit (2005)
Major clients Local: Konka, CECT, Gionee, Eastcom, Teslda and other small brand makersForeign: European operators
Ginwave Technologies Limited
Source: Compiled by the authors based on interviews (2005-2006), company disclosure materials, company
websites, and various articles. Shipment figure based on iSuppli estimates.
SIM Technology Group Limited）
Longcheer Holdings Limited
 
 
Another advantage of Chinese IDHs against Korean and Taiwanese rivals is lower labor cost. This is 
a very important factor because of a “knowledge-labor-intensive” nature of typical 2G handset 
development; the development process is predominantly realized by labor inputs by a small number 
of hi-skilled engineers and many more relatively-unskilled young engineers.  
 
In addition to hi-skilled engineers responsible for the core system development, project managers 
who are responsible for managing the whole process of a development project also play a key role, 
as their capabilities in integrating various designing processes affect the quality and speed of the 
project. However, aside from these limited number of key persons, a great majority of workers in 
IDHs are usually very young engineers with undergraduate or graduate degrees in engineering but 
with limited experience in the industry. Average salaries of those young engineers are much lower 
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than their counterparts in Korea and Taiwan, let alone advanced industrialized countries25. Table 3 
represents the human resource structure of a representative large IDH. It indicates that the share of 
“core engineers” who have a relatively long experience in the handset industry in each type of 
designing process is substantially small. Software development, of which importance has been 
increasing as handsets become more multi-functional, is the most “knowledge-labor-intensive” part 
of the handset development.  
  
 
Table 3. Staff Structure of a Major IDH by Job Type 
 
Number Share in eachjob type
Average length of career
in the handset industry
(years)
Software design 920 25 2.7% 5.2
Hardware design 240 26 10.8% 7.5
Mechanical and exterior 320 21 6.6% 4.7
Procurement 90 5 5.6% 6.0
Sales 50 3 6.0% 8.7
Manufacturing Support 160 5 3.1% 8.0
Project Managers 60 5 8.3% 5.8
Quality Control 120 6 5.0% 7.8
Others 50 n.a. n.a. n.a.
Source: Interview with the company (September 2005).
Job Type
Number of employees in each job type
Core employees
 
 
 
Needless to say, most of the characteristics of 2G handset product development summarized above 
apply not only to IDHs but also to in-house development by local handset makers. As we mentioned 
previously, in response to the growing competitive pressure, major makers come to place more 
emphasis on enhancing their in-house development capabilities. On the other hand, however, it 
should be noted that many of those major makers still opt to outsource substantial part of product 
development to IDHs, as is illustrated by the fact that the list of customers of the largest five IDHs in 
                                                        
25 According to a survey of electronic engineers conducted by Electronic Engineering Times (China) 
in May 2005 (n=2,682), average annual income of the respondents was 76,100 RMB (about 9,200 
Us dollars), around one eighth of the level in advanced industrial countries (“China’s electronic 
engineers’ salaries up 11 %,” emsnow, December 27, 2005 
[http://www.emsnow.com/npps/story.cfm?ID=16369: accessed on September 29, 2006]). 
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Table 2 above includes virtually all of major local makers, including technologically-advanced firms 
such as Huawei, ZTE, and Lenovo. Then the question is, what is the essential advantage of IDHs in 
comparison with in-house design by makers?   
 
Rapid growth and ever-increasing diversity of the domestic market is the most fundamental factor 
that facilitates the emergence of IDHs. The number of handset models released has been increasing 
year by year. According to the official figure announces by MII, there were 876 new handset models 
acquired certification in 2005, which is ten times as many as new handset models released in Japan 
in the same year26.  
 
If a handset maker tries to cover all (or at least most) of product lineups corresponding to greatly 
differentiated market segments on its own, it will incur substantial overhead investment that most of 
local makers are difficult to afford. In contrast, IDHs are able to dilute their development expense by 
converging a proto-type model to a number of various derivative models that share the common 
platform or mainboard and selling the models to several customers27. Major IDHs also enjoy the 
economy of scale in comparison with the second or third tier local handset makers, as the annual 
shipment of handsets designed by each of them exceeds several million units or more. These 
advantage of IDHs have effectively lowered break-even volume of one handset model typically to a 
hundred thousand or less, which in turn facilitates further diversification of the Chinese handset 
market. 
 
Another important factor is the organizational efficiency of IDHs compared with handset makers. By 
focusing exclusively on the handset development business, engineers are endowed with much 
stronger incentive to be efficient and innovative in contrast to the case of makers’ in-house 
development. They are also exposed directly to competition with other IDHs in terms of efficiency 
and innovativeness in product development. On account of the strong incentive and competitive 
pressure engineers face, IDHs have succeeded in substantially shortening the development cycle; a 
full-fresh product development typically requires six month or less28.  
 
 
                                                        
26 “Last year 132 million domestic legal handset shipped, model competition heat up,” www. 
sina.com, June 29, 2006 [accessed on July 4, 2006: in Chinese]. It should be noted, however, the 
concept of “model” may differ substantially between the two countries. In China a minor 
modification to the original model often makes a “new model,” whereas in Japan it is not usually the 
case. 
27 The most typical example is SIM Technologies. The IDH developed 152 models based on twelve 
prototype mainboard in 2005 (2005 Annual Report). 
28 In Japan, it typically takes one to 1.5 year to launch a full-fresh product. 
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Further evolution 
Since a great majority of clients of IDHs are local handset makers, their retreat beginning in 2004 
has affected IDHs adversely too. However, the consequence turned out to be much less serious as 
was the case with their clients. Although the average profit margin of IDHs experienced substantial 
decline in 2004 to 2005, it still remains much higher than that of handset makers29.  
 
There are some reasons that may possibly explain this paradoxically good performance of IDHs. 
Firstly, as competition in the handset market has become more intense, handset makers rely more on 
IDHs to realize quick launching of new products. Secondly, as Table 2 above illustrates, some of 
major IDHs successfully extended their customer base to MNCs and overseas telecom operators. We 
will return to this point in the concluding section.  
 
Thirdly, and probably most importantly, since around 2004, there have been an increasing number of 
illegal handset makers that sell unlicensed and uncertified handsets and semi-illegal makers that sell 
handsets under leased license. They mostly target at the rural area, townships, small cities and 
hinterlands, where lead local makers had once realized their initial success (see the previous section). 
The new entrants’ difference from predecessors is that they promote multi-functional handsets (e.g. 
phones with multimedia player) at substantially lower prices than the similar (but usually much 
higher quality) products from authorized (either foreign or local) makers30. They realized remarkable 
growth by exploiting their marketing competency in niche markets that has not been fully penetrated 
by authentic makers. Some estimates put the annual shipment of such illegal handsets at 10 to 30 
million units. It suggests that the official figure substantially underestimates the scale and the share 
of local makers in China’s domestic market.  
 
Virtually all of those unauthorized handset makers outsource product development to IDHs. It is 
often the case that minuscule IDHs purchase ready-made mainboards from major IDHs, assemble 
them into finished handsets by adding exterior, mechanical design, and other components, then sell 
them under unauthorized or leased brand names.  
 
This proliferation of unauthorized handset makers and IDHs that serve their design outsourcing 
demand has been to a great extent facilitated by further evolution of the industry that has lowered the 
technological entry bar of the handset development. In the following section we examine the new 
evolution: the outgrowth of local IC fables ventures that design core ICs for handsets.  
                                                        
29 Pday Research estimated the average profit margin of IDHs in 2003 to 2005 to be 70 percent, 35 
percent, and 23 percent respectively. 
30 Many of handsets from those unauthorized makers imitate exterior designs and/or functional 
features of popular foreign brand makers. 
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IV. The Second Backward Linkage Effect: Local Core IC Fabless Ventures 
 
Local IC fabless ventures that design core ICs for handsets have just emerged since around 2004 to 
2005. While they still have remained to be marginal players even in the Chinese market, their 
shipment has been recording rapid growth. Their emergence seems to symbolize China’s industrial 
challenge towards further upgrading, which is the reason why we focus on them here. 
 
As we examined in the preceding section, the development of 2G mobile handset is based on 
platforms that have been traditionally provided by US or European semiconductor vendors. The 
assimilation of platform technologies and combination with other key functions has been the most 
critical part of the 2G handset development. 
 
The capabilities of this assimilation and combination of key technologies has been the bottleneck in 
handset development in China, which was also the main reason why major IDHs with such scarce 
capabilities had realized initial success. However, as multi-functionality became the prime driver in 
the Chinese handset market since around 2003, the necessity for alleviating the bottleneck owing to 
the complexity of platform technologies has been strongly felt by local handset makers and IDHs. 
On the other hand, dominant platform vendors like TI were less interested in adjusting their 
platforms so as to lower the technological bar of the handset development for their Chinese 
customers, as their principal focus has been serving the needs of global giants such as Nokia, which 
carry out most of their product development outside China31. 
 
Pathbreaking by MediaTek  
The first great breakthrough was made by MediaTek, a Taiwanese semiconductor fabless that had 
grown by its success in the DVD-controller IC market to be the largest semiconductor fabless in Asia. 
In the early 2000s, in an effort to diversify its business, MediaTek focused on the growing popularity 
of multimedia functions in the mainland’s handset market and developed a so-called “turn-key 
solution” type of platforms. The key characteristic of MediaTek’s platforms are that they 
revolutionarily simplify the development of multi-functionality handsets. By exploiting their 
expertise in multimedia data processing, they integrate the baseband IC and the multimedia 
application processor into a single chip. In this way, while they can lower the cost by reducing the 
size of the chip, they free their clients from a demanding task of combining platforms and 
application processors. At the same time, they package their chipset software for multimedia 
functions such as MP3 of MPEG4 players so that their clients can develop multi-functionality 
                                                        
31 A number of Chinese customers of TI platforms we interviewed pointed out (or even complained 
about) the technological complexity of TI’s products and the company’s insufficient adaptation to the 
Chinese market (Interviews with IDHs and handset makers in August 2006). 
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handsets in a “turn-key” fashion within greatly reduced lead time. 
 
MediaTek’s platforms caught on first among IDHs in 2004, as they were generally dare to try 
newly-born but novel and cheap components. It is estimated that more than a great majority of 
unauthorized handsets utilized MediaTek chipsets for its superior cost performance; then, with the 
growing popularity of multimedia phones in the low- and middle-end markets, MediaTek chipsets 
soon adapted by major makers including Bird, TCL, and Lenovo at a remarkable speed and has 
replaced TI as the dominant platform provider in China by the next year, capturing nearly 40 percent 
of the domestic market of handset baseband platform32. Aside from the suitability of its products to 
China’s market environment, MediaTek’s customer service oriented to Chinese customers (IDHs or 
makers) with relatively weak technological backgrounds and smoother communication owing to the 
common language also bolstered the company’s quick penetration to the mainland market. 
 
Birth of China-based core IC fabless       
The spectacular success of MediaTek has opened a way for a competent local follower, Spreadtrum 
Communications33. Established in 2001 by a bunch of Chinese returnee engineers from Silicon 
Valley with funding by local and overseas venture capitals, the company’s initial target was the 
development of baseband IC for TD-SCDMA, the Chinese-government-endorsed standard of 3G34. 
Although Spreadtrum succeeded in developing baseband IC for the first time as a China-based 
fabless in 2003, the unexpectedly long delay in commercialization of TD-SCDMA in China forced 
the company to refocus on GSM baseband ICs. Almost at the same time as MediaTek’s platform 
caught on, Spreadtrum developed its first GSM baseband IC in early 200435. In the next year the 
company launched SC6600, its first multimedia-focused baseband platform for low-end handsets.   
 
Either intentionally or not, Spreadtrum has been following the footsteps of MediaTek very closely. 
The key feature of the company’s platforms is also turn-key solutions that integrate baseband IC, 
multimedia processor, and power management module and package various software, so that even 
                                                        
32 Estimated by Merrill Lynch (2006). However, those leading handset makers usually continue to 
source platforms from several providers. 
33 The description of Spreadtrum’s business is based on interviews with the company, local IDHs 
and makers (August 2006), and various articles. 
34 TD-SCDMA was first advocated by Siemens. Later the Chinese government decided to adapt the 
technology as the country’s national standard and develop it in cooperation with Siemens. It was 
eventually accepted by International Telecommunication Union (ITU) as one of the international 3G 
standard along with W-CDMA and CDMA 2000. However, there is no country except China as yet 
that expressed intention to introduce the standard.  
35 There are at least five fabless ventures other than Spreadtrum (mostly state-supported joint 
ventures) that have developed baseband chipsets, but they have been exclusively focused on 
TD-SCDMA. Thus, at the point of late 2006 Spreadtrum is the only China-based fabless that 
succeeded in commercialization of its products. 
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customers that lacks enough development resource can development multi-functional phones within 
substantially reduced time at a lower price36. 
 
The company’s outstanding difference with MediaTek is its more emphasis on user customization. In 
order to compete with MediaTek, the company realizes more flexible customization in response to 
the needs of smaller customers by relying on its in-house and third-party software development 
resources. Beginning from relatively minor IDHs and makers (probably including unauthorized 
brands, as is the case with MediaTek), in 2006 several lead makers and IDHs such as Lenovo, Amoi 
and CECW started to adopt Spreadtrum’s platform37. Although Spreadtrum accounts for only around 
five percent of the baseband chipset market in China in 2005, local makers tend to welcome 
home-made platforms for the potential of closer partnership, on condition that their functionality, 
reliability, and future roadmap is secured, suggesting there is substantial market potential to be 
explored by the company.38  
 
Just like the case of local IDHs, it is the recent trend of modularization of semiconductor designing 
technologies par excellence that has enabled quick rise of local IC fabless such as Spreadtrum. Both 
baseband ICs and application processors are based on two core technologies: DSP, or Digital Signal 
Processor, and CPU, or Central Processing Unit. Spreadtrum sources these two core technologies, or 
so-called core IPs, from CEVA and ARM, American and British mainstream core IP providers 
respectively, as many other rivals do39. Vendors of development tools (EDA, or electronic design 
automation) such as Cadence or Mentor Graphics also provide IC fabless with various IPs40. In this 
sense, while IC designing requires much higher skills than is the case with the handset development, 
assimilation and combination of existing key technologies in a way that is adoptive to China’s 
market environment is also the key of the IC designing for local IC fabless ventures.    
 
While Spreadtrum is the only China-based fabless that has realized commercialization of baseband 
IC, in other IC products there are a number of fabless emerging into the scene as the demand for 
localization increases. Among them, we focus on application processors, i.e., chips responsible for 
                                                        
36 Major platform vendors usually charge customers (makers or IDHs) two to three million US 
dollars as licensing fee. In contrast, the licensing fee of emerging platform vendors such as 
MediaTek and Spreadtrum amounts to only two to five hundred thousand dollars.  
37 However, whether these lead companies have adopted Spreadtrum’s GSM platform for 
commercial use or the company’s TD-SCDMA platforms for testing use remains unclear. 
38 Interviews with local makers and IDHs (August 2006). However, many of them are prudent about 
adopting home-made platforms due to uncertainty concerning product reliability and future 
roadmaps. 
39 IPs in the context of IC designing are functional modules that compose part of an IC. CEVA and 
ARM are the by far the largest providers of embedded DSP and CPU respectively.  
40 IPs related to IC manufacturing are provided by foundries such as TSMC or UMC. 
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non-voice data processing, for this is one of the most technologically complex product next to 
baseband IC.  
 
Stand-alone type application processors compete with one-chip solutions provided by MediaTek and 
Spreadtrum, in which baseband IC and application processors are integrated in a single chip. 
Generally speaking, they are more costly than one-chip solution but can realize higher processing 
capacity. 
 
Vimicro is probably the most successful China-based provider of application processors for mobile 
handsets. The venture was established in 1999 also by Silicon Valley returnees and realized initial 
success in image-processors for Web cameras. By 2004 the company claimed that it captured 60 
percent of the global market of the product. Knowing the growth potential in the web camera market 
will be exhausted soon, the company set out to develop multi-media application processor, to which 
they can apply their competency in image-processing technologies. The company announced that 
their processors have been adopted by 150 models, including those of leading maker such as Lenovo, 
ZTE, and Samsung. The merits of Vimicro’s processors are quite similar to the case of Spreadtrum: 
product lineup tailored to various demands for multimedia functions in the Chinese market; 
meticulous services for local customers; low cost. There are several processor providers following 
suit. 
 
It should be noted that policy measures have played an important role in fostering the rapid 
emergence of local IC fabless since around 2000. In the year the State Council issued a decree to 
rebate six percent of value-added tax out of 17 percent to semiconductor and software companies 
registered in China41. MII also provides subsidies to Chinese firms engaged in cutting-edge IT 
development projects. Both Spreadtrum and Vimicro have been beneficiaries of subsidies from MII. 
However, at the early stage of their business they were not necessary the most important targets of 
semiconductor industrial policy. There are a number of projects that had received much more 
funding from the government but ended up with nothing or remained commercially unviable. Thus, 
entrepreneurship, rather than policy supports, is the major factor that led the success of Spreadtrum 
and Vimicro.     
 
 
 
 
                                                        
41 The decree was abolished in 2004 as a result of strong pressure from the US government. 
However, helped partly by the hefty incentives provided by the decree, the number of IC fabless in 
China grew almost fivefold since 2000 to 2004. 
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V. Dynamics of Indigenous Industrial Upgrading 
 
As we examined in the preceding three sections, the rise and retreat of local makers and subsequent 
competition in China’s mobile handset market has induced unique evolution that leads to the 
country’s indigenous industrial upgrading: outgrowth of IDHs specialized in handset development 
and IC fabless ventures that design core ICs for handsets.  
 
Hirschman described in his seminal work (1957) the process of unbalanced growth, advocating the 
concepts of backward and forward linkage effects. He pointed out that the growth of lower-stream 
industries in the first place creates tension (i.e., imbalance) that at some point induces the consequent 
growth of upper-stream industries. As we already discussed in section II, we assume the outgrowth 
of the two new business in China’s handset industry as a variant of backward linkage effects. We call 
it a “variant” because the configuration of the industry emerging out of the process is substantially 
different from its precedents in advanced countries, as the large presence of IDHs and the growing 
prevalence of “turn-key” solution illustrate. Figure 6 summarized the way how the backward linkage 
effects have worked in China’s handset industry42 (see next page).   
 
Meanwhile, we need to note that, as was stressed by Hirschman, backward linkage effects work only 
under certain conditions. Firstly, in the case of the mobile handset industry we surveyed, the 
“strategic depth” of the Chinese market is the most important factor that has been facilitating the 
work of linkage effects. The geographic scale of the territory and the great diversity in income and 
consumer preference makes it possible for technologically-disadvantaged local makers to survive 
amid rivalry with giant MNCs43. At the same time, this segmentations and their elusiveness in the 
domestic market advantages agile organizations such as local IDHs and IC fabless ventures.  
 
Secondly, policy interventions play a supportive role especially at the onset of the industrial growth. 
However, after the initial phase their significance tends to decrease, as the fate of the 
entry-restriction into the handset business designated by Decree No.5 illustrates. 
 
                                                        
42 Note that aside from the competitive relationships described in the figure, there are potential 
competitions between neighboring “low-stream” firms and “up-stream” firms, such as between 
handset makers and IDHs (handset makers may opt to enhance in-house development; IDHs may opt 
to become brand makers), or as between IDHs and platform providers (turn-key solutions provided 
by platform vendors may eclipse value-added of IDHs). These potential competitions between 
“lower-stream” and “upper stream” are also the important drivers of the industrial evolution. 
43 If MNCs try to penetrate into the domestic market further by, say, extending their marketing 
networks, it would incur cost that may not necessarily pay. 
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Figure 6. The backward linkage effects in China’s mobile phone handset industry 
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Thirdly, the ample supply of human resource is also one of the key factors that has fostered the 
realization of the linkage effects in China. At the initial stage of the industrial development, sufficient 
endowment of human resource is not necessarily required. What is essential is the certain amount of 
supply of key entrepreneurs and engineers that play the role of “seeds.” In China, where the supply 
of human resource has been highly elastic, as industrial growth initiated by the “seeds” gets on the 
track, the resultant shortage of human resource is likely to call forth the more-than sufficient increase 
in supply. In recent years, the number of undergraduates and graduates majoring science and 
technology has been rising rapidly as the demand for engineers goes up (Figure 7). 
 
 
Figure 7. Number of Undergraduates and Graduates in Science and Technology 
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Lastly, with regard to the case of the handset industry, IDHs and local IC fabless would not have 
appeared if it were not for the global trend of modularization of both mobile handset and 
semiconductor technologies. In China the growth of IDHs and IC fabless in turn has further 
accelerated the local trend of modularization (e.g. development of derivative models based on the 
same mainboard; turn-key solution that can be adopted across many models).  
 
However, this local trend of modularization naturally has its drawbacks. While modularization 
facilitates product development based on a “new” combination of existing technologies, it is also apt 
to invite sheer imitation, as is often the case with China’s handset industry. In this case there is a risk 
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that originally innovative steps towards industrial upgrading such as the outgrowth of IDHs and core 
IC fabless may rather hinder further upgrading of the indigenous industry44.  
 
VI. Conclusion 
 
In this paper we examined the emergence and evolution of the mobile phone handset industry in 
China. Our case illustrates that, while export growth has been overwhelmingly led by MNCs, 
increasingly fierce competition in the domestic market ignited by the advent of local handset makers 
has induced unique organizational evolution that has led to capability building of the indigenous 
industry. This “dual-track” nature of industrial growth and evolution suggests that the conventional 
IPN-centric view of latecomer industrialization and upgrading may need to be modified in order to 
fully accommodate China’s rise in recent years45. 
 
The evolution of China’s mobile handset industry seems to have international implications. As 
competition in the domestic market has been heated up, Chinese handset makers and IDHs have 
become increasingly outward-oriented. While exports of handset by local makers recorded more than 
100 percent growth in 2005, it still accounted for only 5.8 percent of the total exports, However, as 
the demand for low-cost and multi-functional phones is expected to grow in the emerging markets in 
the future, it is quite probable that organizational capabilities of China’s mobile handset industry 
tailored to the similar demand for price effectiveness and multi-functionality turn out to be 
advantageous to further outward-development of the industry.  
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Appendix 1:  World Production of Electronics Industry by Region (1991-2004) 
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Note: East Asia includes China (including Hong Kong), Korea, Taiwan, Singapore, Malaysia, 
Indonesia, the Philippines, Thailand, and Vietnam.  
Source: Reed Economics Research, Yearbook of World Electronics Data, Various years 
 
*To be updated. 
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Appendix 2:  World Production of IT Hardware by Region (1991-2004) 
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Note:: IT hardware includes electronic data processing machinery (including peripherals) radio 
communication equipment, and their components.  
 
*To be updated. 
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